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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________________ 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Juniel Charleswell was convicted on various criminal 
charges in the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands, but the 
Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
reversed and held that he was entitled to a new trial.  The 
Appellate Division concluded that the Territorial Court committed 
plain error because it gave a curative instruction, instead of 
declaring a mistrial sua sponte, when the prosecutor made 
improper remarks during rebuttal summation.  The Government of 
the Virgin Islands has appealed this decision, and Charleswell 
has cross-appealed.  We hold that the Territorial Court did not 
commit plain error in failing to grant a mistrial sua sponte 
based on the prosecutor's comments.  We do not reach the 
arguments raised in Charleswell's cross-appeal because those 
arguments, although raised before the Appellate Division, were 
not addressed by that court.  We therefore reverse the decision 
of the Appellate Division and remand to that court so that it can 
consider Charleswell's remaining arguments. 
 
I. 
 In 1990, Charleswell was charged by information with 
(count I) assault on a peace officer with a deadly weapon, in 
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violation of 14 V.I.C. § 297(5); (count II) possession of a 
deadly weapon with intent to use it during the commission of a 
crime of violence, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2251(a)(2)(B); 
(count III) drawing and exhibiting a deadly weapon, in violation 
of 14 V.I.C. § 621(1); and (count IV) destruction of personal 
property, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 1266.   
 Charleswell was tried on these charges before a jury in 
the Territorial Court.  The evidence showed the following.  At 
about 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. on the morning of September 24, 1990, 
Charleswell, an off-duty police officer, called the police 
dispatcher in St. Thomas and stated, using code, that the police 
station at Four Winds Plaza was under attack.  Charleswell then 
drove to that station armed with his service revolver.  According 
to Officer Milton Petersen, who was on duty at the time, 
Charleswell pointed the revolver at Petersen's chest.  Petersen 
stated that he pushed Charleswell's hand away just before 
Charleswell pulled the trigger.  As a result, the bullet was 
fired into the ceiling.  Charleswell told Petersen that he did 
not want to hurt him, and Petersen left the station.  Charleswell 
then went upstairs and obtained a shotgun.  After telephoning 
Central Command and demanding that the dispatcher send more 
officers to the Four Winds Plaza station, Charleswell fired 
several shotgun blasts into the wall.  He then walked downstairs 
and outside, where he fired the shotgun once into the ground. 
After speaking with the officers assembled outside, he entered 
his vehicle and drove to Central Command. 
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 When Charleswell arrived, Central Command had been 
evacuated.  Charleswell entered the building and fired rounds 
into the walls.  At about 6:00 a.m., after speaking with several 
officers, he surrendered. 
 At trial, the "primary thrust" of Charleswell's defense 
was that, because of diminished capacity, he lacked the specific 
intent necessary to commit the offenses charged in counts I and 
II.  App. Div. Op. at 4.  Charleswell took the stand and 
testified that he had been mistreated on the job because he had 
arrested the son of the chief of police.  This mistreatment, he 
said, had caused great stress and had induced him to "do a lot of 
drinking," to attempt suicide, and to obtain psychiatric 
counseling.  App. 246-47.  He testified that the stress had built 
up on him for two days and had then "somewhat exploded."  Id. at 
249.  He also testified that he had consumed "a couple of beers" 
before driving to the Four Winds Plaza station.  Id. at 251. 
 During rebuttal summation, the prosecutor made the 
following comments: 
We know he's [Charleswell] not crazy 
otherwise he would have pleaded insanity. So, 
what is this?  It's just -- he's asking 
"excuse me for what I did."  Now, if the 
defendant does need help to cope with stress, 
then acquitting him, finding him not guilty 
of all of those charges is not going to get 
him that help.  It's just not. 
 
App. at 386.   
 Defense counsel did not object when the prosecutor made 
these comments but instead waited until the court had instructed 
the jury.  The court and both attorneys then engaged in a lengthy 
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discussion concerning the need for and the phrasing of curative 
instructions (see App. 436-44), and the court gave detailed 
curative instructions.  With respect to the prosecutor's 
reference to the defendant's failure to raise an insanity 
defense, the court stated:  "I just want to remind you that the 
defendant has no obligation to raise any particular defense or to 
produce any evidence or even call any witnesses," and the court 
therefore instructed the jury "to disregard that comment."  Id. 
at 445.  With respect to the prosecutor's statement regarding the 
defendant's alleged need for help to cope with stress, the court 
stated:  "Now, that might lead to the wrong conclusion, that you 
have to find him guilty to get him help.  Okay, and we didn't 
want to leave you with that impression."  Id.  The court then 
reminded the jurors that if they did not find that all of the 
elements of the offenses had been established beyond a reasonable 
doubt, they were required to find the defendant not guilty.  Id. 
at 446.  After giving these instructions, the court stated:  "All 
right, Attorney Hodge [Charleswell's counsel] and Miss Counts 
[the prosecutor]?"  Id.  Charleswell's counsel responded:  "Yes." 
Id.  At no time did Charleswell's attorney request that the court 
grant a mistrial based on the prosecutor's remarks. 
 The jury found Charleswell guilty on all four counts. 
After sentencing, Charleswell appealed to the Appellate Division 
of the District Court, contending that he was entitled to 
judgment of acquittal on counts I and II and that the Territorial 
Court had erred in refusing to grant a continuance, in excluding 
certain expert testimony, and in failing to declare a mistrial 
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based on the prosecutor's remarks in rebuttal summation.  Without 
reaching Charleswell's other arguments, the Appellate Division 
held that the prosecutor's comments had resulted in plain error. 
The court explained: 
The prosecutor's remarks pertained to a 
central issue at trial, namely appellant's 
purported diminished capacity.  It was 
entirely inappropriate to discuses 
appellant's choice of plea and to predict 
that an acquittal would serve to deny 
appellant's the psychiatric treatment he 
needs.  We hold that these comments severely 
prejudiced appellant's right to a fair trial 
and that the curative instructions were 
insufficient to remedy this particularly 
egregious misconduct. 
 
 The Government of the Virgin Islands subsequently filed 
a notice of appeal to this court, and Charleswell then filed 
notice of cross-appeal. 
 
II. 
 Before reaching the merits of the appeal or cross-
appeal, we must decide whether we have appellate jurisdiction. 
 A.  Charleswell argues that we lack jurisdiction over 
the Government of the Virgin Islands' appeal because the 
Appellate Division's decision granting a new trial was not a 
"final" decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Charleswell relies on 
In the Matter of Alison, 837 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1988), in which we 
held that a particular order of the Appellate Division remanding 
a civil case for trial in the Territorial Court was not "final" 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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 In this case, however, our jurisdiction over the 
Government of the Virgin Islands' appeal is not dependent on 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Instead, we have jurisdiction over that appeal 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, which provides in pertinent part: 
 In a criminal case, an appeal by the 
United States shall lie to a court of appeals 
from a decision, judgment, or order of a 
district court . . . granting a new trial 
after verdict or judgment, as to any one or 
more counts . . . . 
 
 While this provision refers to an appeal by "the United 
States," we have held that it applies to appeals taken by the 
Government of the Virgin Islands.  Government of the Virgin 
Islands v. Christensen, 673 F.2d 713, 716 (3d Cir. 1982). 
Moreover, in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Mills, 935 F.2d 
591, 595-97 (3d Cir. 1991), we specifically held that this 
provision authorizes the Government of the Virgin Islands to 
appeal a district court order granting a new trial.  Although the 
district court in Mills had sat in its capacity as a trial court, 
rather than in its capacity as an appellate tribunal reviewing 
decisions of the Territorial Court, the language of 18 U.S.C. 
§3731 provides no basis for holding that our jurisdiction varies 
depending on the capacity in which the district court sat.  Thus, 
we conclude that we have jurisdiction over the Government of the 
Virgin Islands' appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731. 
 B.  We also hold that the Government of the Virgin 
Islands' notice of appeal was timely.  The Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure govern appeals to our court from the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands.  Vasquez v. Fleming, 617 F.2d 334 
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(3d Cir. 1980).1  Therefore, the time limits for the filing of a 
notice of appeal in a criminal case are those set out in Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(b).  At the time in question here,2 this provision 
stated in relevant part:  
                                                           
1In Vasquez we relied on language in 48 U.S.C. § 1615 (1982) 
(amended 1984) stating that such appeals were subject to "[t]he 
rules of practice and procedure" promulgated by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072.  We wrote 
(617 F.2d at 335): 
 
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were 
promulgated under section 2072 and thus by 
the text of section 1615 would appear to 
apply to appeals from the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands.   
 
After the Vasquez decision, this language was deleted from 48 
U.S.C. § 1615, and similar language was placed in 48 U.S.C. 
§1614(b), which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
 
Where appropriate . . . the rules of practice 
heretofore or hereafter promulgated and made 
effective by the Congress or the Supreme 
Court of the United States pursuant to Titles 
11, 18, and 28 shall apply to the district 
court and appeals therefrom . . . . 
 
Under this language, it remains clear, in our view, that the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure apply to appeals to our 
court from the District Court of the Virgin Islands. 
2By amendment effective on December 1, 1993, Rule 4(b) was 
reworded to provide in pertinent part as follows: 
 
In a criminal case, a defendant shall file 
the notice of appeal in the district court 
within 10 days after the entry either of the 
judgment or order appealed from, or a notice 
of appeal by the Government. . . .  When an 
appeal by the government is authorized by 
statute, the notice of appeal must be filed 
in the district court within 30 days after 
the entry of (i) the entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from or (ii) the filing of a 
notice of appeal by any defendant.    
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In a criminal case, the notice of appeal by a 
defendant shall be filed in the district 
court within 10 days after the entry of (i) 
the judgment or order appealed from, or (ii) 
a notice of appeal by the Government. . . . 
When an appeal by the government is 
authorized by statute, the notice of appeal 
shall be filed in the district court within 
30 days after the entry of (i) judgment or 
order appealed from or (ii) a notice of 
appeal by any defendant.  
 
 We conclude for two reasons that the references to the 
"government" in this rule applies to the Government of the Virgin 
Islands.  First, we believe that circuit precedent weighs in 
favor of this interpretation.  In Christensen, as previously 
noted, we held that an appeal by the Government of the Virgin 
Islands is an appeal by "the United States" under 18 U.S.C. 
§3731.  An appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 is, in the language of 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(b), an instance in which "an appeal by the 
government is authorized by statute."  Consequently, Christensen 
suggests that the term "government" in Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) 
should be interpreted to include the Government of the Virgin 
Islands.  Second, if the term "government" in Fed. R. App. P. 
4(b) is not interpreted to include the Government of the Virgin 
Islands, then Rule 4(b) does not seem to provide any time period 
for the filing of a notice of appeal by the Government of the 
Virgin Islands.  Rule 4(b) sets out only two time periods:  10 
days for the "defendant" and 30 days for the "government" -- and 
the Government of the Virgin Islands is certainly not the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Even if this version of Rule 4(b) were applicable to this case, 
the rewording would not affect our disposition of the issues 
presented in this appeal. 
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"defendant."  Accordingly, we hold that, in an appeal to our 
court from the Appellate Division in a criminal case, the 
Government of the Virgin Islands must file its notice of appeal 
within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal 
is taken. 
 The Government of the Virgin Islands complied with this 
requirement here.  The order of the Appellate Division was 
entered on April 21, 1993, and the Government of the Virgin 
Islands filed its notice of appeal 28 days later, on May 19. 
 C.  The remaining jurisdictional question that we must 
consider concerns Charleswell's cross-appeal.  At the time in 
question here, Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) stated that a defendant in a 
criminal case was required to file notice of appeal "within 10 
days after the entry of (i) the judgment or order appealed from, 
or (ii) a notice of appeal by the Government"  (emphasis added).3  
In this case, since the "Government" filed a notice of appeal, 
Charleswell was required to file his notice of appeal "within ten 
days after the entry" of the Government's notice of appeal -- in 
other words, within ten days after the filing of the Government 
of the Virgin Islands' notice of appeal was entered on the 
district court docket.  See United States v. Cantero, 995 F.2d 
1407, 1408 n.1 (7th Cir. 1993) (entry of order means entry on 
docket); United States v. Cooper, 876 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir. 
1989) (same); United States v. Zuleta-Molina, 840 F.2d 157, 158 
                                                           
3As previously noted, Rule 4(b) has now been reworded, but this 
change would not alter our decision.  See page 9, footnote 2, 
supra. 
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n.1 (1st Cir. 1988) (same).  Charleswell complied with this 
requirement.  The Government of the Virgin Islands' notice of 
appeal was entered on the district court docket on May 26, 1993, 
and Charleswell filed his notice of appeal seven days later, on 




 We now turn to the merits of the Government of the 
Virgin Islands' appeal.  We agree with the Territorial Court and 
the Appellate Division that the challenged remarks made by the 
prosecutor during rebuttal summation were improper.  Neither 
Charleswell's decision not to raise an insanity defense nor his 
likelihood of obtaining help for stress if acquitted had any 
bearing on the issues before the jury.  However, the Territorial 
Court's failure to grant a mistrial sua sponte was not "plain 
error" under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
 Even if Charleswell's attorney had moved for a 
mistrial, we could not reverse Charleswell's convictions based on 
the prosecutor's remarks, unless those remarks, "taken in the 
context of the trial as a whole, were sufficiently prejudicial to 
have deprived [him] of his right to a fair trial."  United States 
v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d 1282, 1297 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 1228 (1985); see also, e.g., United States v. Gambino, 
926 F.2d 1355, 1365 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 415 
(1991).  Among the factors that must be considered in assessing 
prejudice are the nature of the comments in question and the 
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effect of curative instructions.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Homer, 545 F.2d 864, 867-68 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 
U.S. 954 (1977).  Here, the challenged comments, while 
inappropriate, do not appear to us highly prejudicial.  In 
addition, these remarks were apparently "not so shocking as to 
suggest to the defense that it seek curative instructions 
immediately.  Moreover, in response to the defendant's subsequent 
complaint, the trial judge admonished the jury" to disregard 
these comments.  Homer, 545 F.2d at 868. 
 In any event, even if the defense would have been 
entitled to a mistrial upon request, the trial court's failure to 
grant a mistrial on its own initiative was not plain error.  The 
"plain error" doctrine "is to be used sparingly, solely in those 
circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise 
result."  United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 & n.14 
(1982).  Its proper role is "to correct particularly egregious 
errors" and to "redress . . . miscarriages of justice."  Id. at 
163.  It is intended to correct errors that are "obvious" or that 
"otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings."  United States v. Atkinson, 
297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936).  "By its terms, recourse may be had to 
[Rule 52(b)] only on appeal from a trial infected with error so 
`plain' the trial judge [was] derelict in countenancing it, even 
absent the defendant's timely assistance in detecting it." Frady, 
456 U.S. at 163; see also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 
(1985); Government of Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 
630-31 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 556 (1993); Government 
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of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 949 F.2d 677, 681 (3d Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Wright, 921 F.2d 42, 46 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied 111 S. Ct. 2803; United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 
309 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089.     
 In this case, the trial judge was not "derelict" in 
failing to grant a mistrial.  As we have said, it is far from 
clear that the prosecutor's remarks were so prejudicial that they 
could not be remedied by curative instructions.  Furthermore, 
since the defense requested curative instructions rather than a 
mistrial, the trial judge was entitled to assume that the defense 
did not want a mistrial.  Under such circumstances, the test for 
granting a mistrial is "manifest necessity."  See, e.g., Oregon 
v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982); Arizona v. Washington, 434 
U.S. 497, 509 (1978).  There was no "manifest necessity" here. 
Consequently, we hold that the Territorial Court did not commit 
plain error in failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte. 
 
IV. 
 We turn finally to Charleswell's cross-appeal.  The 
arguments that Charleswell raises in his cross-appeal4 were 
                                                           
4If accepted, Charleswell's argument that he was entitled to 
judgment of acquittal on counts I and II would result in 
alteration of the district court's judgment.  It is therefore a 
proper subject for cross-appeal.  Charleswell's remaining 
arguments, if accepted, would merely provide alternative grounds 
for affirming the district court's order granting a new trial, 
and consequently Charleswell could have raised them without 
cross-appealing.  See 15A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 3904 (1992 & Supp. 1994). (citing 
cases).  In any event, since the district court did not reach any 
of these arguments, we find it appropriate to remand so that that 
court can consider them in the first instance. 
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raised before the Appellate Division, but they were not addressed 
by that court, and we decline to address these arguments in the 
first instance.  Instead, we will remand so that they can be 
decided initially by the Appellate Division. 
 For these reasons, the order of the Appellate Division 
of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
